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Edelstein: Inevitable Disclosure of Trade Secrets

NOTE

INTELLECTUAL SLAVERY?: THE DOCTRINE
OF INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE OF TRADE
SECRETS

I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past several years, lawsuits filed by employers
seeking to prevent valued employees from taking positions
with their competitors have become increasingly frequent.l In
PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond,2 the Seventh Circuit gave further
stimulus to this trend by holding that a softdrink executive
would inevitably disclose the softdrink company's trade secrets
and other confidential information if he were to work for the
company's competitor in a comparable position. 3 Moreover,
because the PepsiCo court upheld an injunction prohibiting the
executive from taking the position rather than simply prohibiting his disclosure of trade secrets,4 the court's application of
the inevitable disclosure theory effectively turns confidentiality
agreements into non-compete agreements. 5 Based on this decision, employers seeking to prevent an employee from leaving
need no longer risk the judicial disfavor and scrutiny traditionally experienced in suits to enforce non-compete agreements. 6
1. DiBoise and Berger, Inevitable Disclosure of Trade Secrets, 20 NEW MATTER
28 (1995).
2. PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1263, (7th Cir. 1995) per Judge Flaum.
3. Id.
4.Id.
5. Id.
6. MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAw § 13.02 at 13-12 (1988). Modern
decisions emphasize the importance of employee mobility. As observed by one
court, "our free economy is based upon competition," and workers cannot be compelled to erase from their minds all of the general skills, knowledge, and acquain-
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PepsiCo is also important because it is the first Illinois
case to successfully treat inevitable disclosure 7 as threatened
misappropriationS under the Illinois Trade Secret Act. 9 The
inevitable disclosure theory has traditionally been distinguished from threatened misappropriation on the basis of intent. lO A finding of inevitable disclosure does not require proof
of intent, in contrast to threatened misappropriation. ll Wherever the Uniform Trade Secret Act has been adopted, federal
and state courts have struggled with whether inevitable disclo-

tances and the overall experience acquired during employment upon taking another
job. Kalnitz v. Ion Exchange Products, Inc., 276 N.E.2d 60, 62 (Ill. App. 1972).
Accordingly, noncompetition clauses in employment contracts are strictly construed
against the employer. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAw § 13-12; See also DiBoise and
Berger, Getting Around Barriers To Non-Compete Pacts, 2 NATL L.J. C12-14
(1995).
7. Under the inevitable disclosure theory, the ex-employer seeks an injunction
prohibiting employment, not just disclosure of trade secrets. This is based on three
factors: (1) whether the fonner employer and the new employer are competitors;
(2) whether the employee's new position is comparable to his or her fonner position; and (3) the efficacy of steps taken by the new employer to prevent the alleged misappropriation of trade secrets. If an employee changes jobs but remains
in the same profession or trade, she may find it impossible to avoid drawing upon
the skills and experience she developed at her previous jobs. Thus, disclosure may
become a nearly inevitable event even though the employee does not intend to
appropriate her fonner employers' trade secrets. DiBoise and Berger, supra note 1
at ,28.; See generally Suellen Lowry, Inevitable Disclosure Trade Secret Disputes:
Dissolutions of Concurrent Property Interests, 40 STAN. L. REV. 519, (1988);
PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1268.
8. The Illinois Trade Secret Act provides for an injunction prohibiting the
threat of misappropriation of trade secrets. This is typically satisfied by showing
an intent to disclose trade secrets. In contrast, the inevitable disclosure theory
does not consider the intent of the ex-employee. Illinois Trade Secret Act, CH 765
§ 1065/2; See also, DiBoise and Berger, supra note 1 at 28.
9. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1263; Teradyne, Inc. v. Clear Communications Corp.,
707 F.Supp. 353 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (this was the first Illinois case contemplating the
inevitable disclosure theory in a threatened misappropriation cause of action);
Illinois Trade Secret Act, CH 765 § 1065/2. Illinois, as well as twenty one states,
including California have adopted the Unifonn Trade Secret Act. JAGER, TRADE
SECRETS LAw § 13.02 at 13-12.
10. DiBoise and Berger, supra note 1 at 28; See, e.g., BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, 1480 (6th Ed. 1990) (defining "threat" as a "communicated intent to inflict
hann on any person or property"); AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, 840 (3rd Edition)(defining "threat" as an "expression of an intention to inflict pain, injury, or
evil").
11. DiBoise and Berger, supra note 1 at 28.
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sure is an appropriate ground on which to base an order enjoining employment. 12 Because California has adopted the
V.T.S.A. and because PepsiCo was a fact intensive analysis,
this decision will affect California law. 13
This note will discuss the Seventh Circuit's analysis and
the potential impact of the PepsiCo decision. The author will
ultimately conclude that application of the inevitable disclosure
theory in actions to prevent employers from working for competitors creates a substantial risk for employees, impedes their
mobility, limits their options and strips them of their bargaining power. 14 Additionally, this note will argue that general
acceptance of the inevitable disclosure theory could have a
serious impact on a wide range of industries, stifling the dissemination of general technical knowledge and economic
growth. 15
II. FACTS
William Redmond, Jr. (hereinafter "Redmond") worked for
PepsiCo, a soft drink manufacturer, for ten years in the capacity of a managerial employee. IS In June 1993, Redmond became the general manager of the Northern California Business
Unit. 17 One year later, Redmond was promoted to general
manager of the business unit which covered all of California. IS
Redmond's relatively high position at PepsiCo gave him
access to inside information and trade secrets. 19 Redmond was
12. [d.

13. Interview with Thomas J. McCarthy, Attorney at Law, in San Francisco,
CA (Nov. 15 1995).; The 1979 meeting of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, after ten years of study, approved a Uniform Trade
Secrets Act. The Uniform Trade Secret Act has become law in twenty-one states.
The California Uniform Act became law on January 1, 1985. The Dlinois Trade
Secrets Act became law in 1988. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAw § 3.04 at 3-23
(1988).
14. See infra notes 117-140 and accompanying text.
15. DiBoise and Berger, Getting Around Barriers To Non·Compete Pacts, 2
NAT'L L.J. C12 (1995).
16. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1264. Redmond worked at PepsiCo from 1984 to 1994.
[d.
17. [d.
18. [d.
19. [d. Trade Secrets are business information that is the subject of reasonable

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1996

3

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 8

720

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:717

privy to PepsiCo's strategic plans, operational innovations, and
marketing decisions. 20 To guard against the possibility of disclosure, PepsiCo required Redmond, like other PepsiCo employees, to sign a confidentiality agreement. 21
In May, 1994, Quaker began courting Redmond. 22
Throughout this time, Redmond kept his negotiations with
Quaker secret from his employers at PepsiCo. 23 On October,
23, 1994, Quaker offered Redmond the position of Vice President-On Premise Sales for Gatorade. 24 Redmond did not accept the offer but continued to negotiate for more money.25 On
November 8, 1994, Quaker extended Redmond a written offer
for the position of Vice President-Field Operations for
Gatorade, and Redmond accepted. 26
Later that same day, Redmond called William Bensyl, the
Senior Vice President of Human Resources for PepsiCo. 27
Redmond told Bensyl that he had had an offer from Quaker to
become the Chief Operating Officer of the combined Gatorade

efforts to preserve confidentiality and has value because it is not generally known
in the trade. MCCARTHY'S DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 344
(1991).
20. Id. at 1265. For example, knowing the pricing architecture would allow a
competitor to anticipate PepsiCo's pricing moves and underbid PepsiCo strategically
whenever and wherever the competitor so desired. Pursuant to the attack plans,
PepsiCo dedicates extra funds to supporting its brands against other brand in
selected markets. The new delivery system could give PepsiCo an advantage over
its competitors in negotiations with retailer over shelf space and merchandising.
PepsiCo feared Redmond would disclose his intimate knowledge of these plans. Id.
at 1265-1266.
21. [d. at 1264. The confidentiality agreement stated in relevant part that
Redmond would not disclose at any time, to anyone other than officers or employees of PepsiCo, or make use of, confidential information relating to the business of
PepsiCo which is not generally known or available to the public or recognized as
standard practices. [d.
22. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1264. The facts of this case lay against a backdrop of
fierce beverage-industry competition between Quaker and PepsiCo, especially in
sports drinks and new age drinks. Quaker's sports drink, "Gatorade," is the dominant brand in its market niche. PepsiCo introduced its Gatorade rival, "All Sport,"
in March and April of 1994, but sales of All Sport lagged behind those of
Gatorade. [d.
23. [d.
24. [d.
25. [d.
26. [d.
27. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1264.
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and Snapple company.28 Redmond further stated that he had
not yet accepted that offer. 29 Redmond also misstated his situation to a number of his PepsiCo colleagues, reporting that he
was leaning "60/40" in favor of accepting the new position
when he had in fact already accepted. 30
On November 10, 1994, Redmond resigned from
PepsiCo. 31 PepsiCo immediately informed Redmond that it
was considering legal action against him for threat of misappropriation of trade secrets and breach of the confidentiality
agreement. 32
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Six days later, on November 16, 1994, PepsiCo filed suit
seeking a temporary restraining order to enjoin Redmond from
assuming his duties at Quaker and to prevent him from disclosing trade secrets and confidential information to his new
employer.33 The district court granted the injunction that
same day.34 However, two days later the court dissolved the
order sua sponte 35 because it found that PepsiCo failed to
meet its burden of establishing that it would suffer irreparable
harm. 3s
PepsiCo next sought a preliminary injunction against
Redmond and Quaker. 37 From November 23, 1994 to Decem-

28. Id. Quaker purchased Snapple beverage Corp., a large new-age-drink maker, in late 1994. PepsiCo's products have about half of the new age drink market
share. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. The colleagues included Craig Weatherup, President and Chief Executive Officer, and Brenda Barnes, Chief Operating Officer and Redmond's immediate
superior. Id.
31. Id at 1265.
32. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1265.
33.Id.
34.Id.
35. Id.; See e.g., BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, 993 (6th Ed. 1990) (defining "Sua
sponte" as voluntarily; without prompting or suggestion; of its own will or motion).
36. Id. The court found that PepsiCo's fears about Redmond were based upon
a mistaken understanding of his new position at Quaker and that the likelihood
that Redmond would improperly reveal any confidential information did not rise
above mere speculation. Id.
37. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1265.
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ber 1, 1994, the district court conducted a preliminary injunction hearing. 3s At the hearing, PepsiCo listed confidential information and trade secrets that Redmond was privy to, and
which PepsiCo desired to protect from misappropriation. 39
Having shown Redmond's intimate knowledge of PepsiCo's
1995 plans, PepsiCo argued that Redmond would inevitably
disclose that information to Quaker in his new position. 40
Redmond and Quaker countered that Redmond's primary
initial duties at Quaker would be to integrate Snapple and
Gatorade distribution. 41 Additionally, they argued that this
integration would be conducted according to a pre-existing
plan. 42 Therefore, Redmond asserted that his special knowledge of PepsiCo's strategies would be irrelevant. 43 PepsiCo
responded that no preexisting business plan existed. 44

38. [d.
39. [d. First, PepsiCo identified it's "Strategic Plans," an annually revised
document that contains PepsiCo's plans to compete, its financial goals, and its
strategies for manufacturing, production, marketing, packaging, and distribution for
the coming three years. The Strategic Plan derives much of its value from the fact
that it is secret and competitors cannot anticipate PepsiCo's next moves. Second,
PepsiCo pointed to their "Annual Operating Plan" (AOP) as a trade secret. The
AOP bears a label that reads "Private and Confidential-Do Not Reproduce" and is
considered highly confidential by PepsiCo managers. Knowing PepsiCo's pricing
architecture would allow a competitor to anticipate their pricing moves and underbid them strategically whenever and wherever a competitor so desired. PepsiCo
also showed that Redmond had intimate knowledge of their attack plans for specific markets. Finally, PepsiCo offered evidence of their trade secrets regarding innovation in its selling and delivery systems. Under this plan, PepsiCo was to test a
new delivery system that could give them an advantage over its competitors in
negotiations with retailers over shelf space and merchandising. [d.
40. [d. at 1266. At the new position, PepsiCo argued, Redmond would have
substantial input as to Gatorade and Snapple pricing, costs, margins, distribution
systems, products, packaging and marketing, and could give Quaker an unfair
advantage in its upcoming skirmishes with PepsiCo. [d.
41. [d. Redmond and Quaker argued that his new position consisted of integrating Gatorade and Snapple distribution and then managing that distribution as
well as the promotion, marketing and sales of these products. They further asserted Redmond's knowledge was irrelevant because PepsiCo and Quaker distribute
their products in entirely different ways. [d.
42. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1266.
43. [d.
44. [d. As of November, 1994, the plan to integrate Gatorade and Snapple
distribution constituted of a single distributorship agreement and a two-page "contract terms summary." Such a basic plan would not lend itself to widespread application among the over 300 independent Snapple distributors. PepsiCo further
argued that Snapple's 1995 marketing and promotion plans had not necessarily
been completed prior to Redmond's joining Quaker. Consequently, the plans were
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Redmond would, therefore, likely have input in creating those
plans, and if he did, Redmond would inevitably be making
decisions with PepsiCo's strategic plans in mind. 45 Moreover,
PepsiCo's continued, diverging testimony made it difficult to
determine exactly what Redmond would be doing at Quaker.46
Finally, PepsiCo asserted that Redmond would have an important position in the Gatorade hierarchy, and PepsiCo's trade
secrets would inevitably and necessarily influence strategic
decisions.4.7
On December, 15, 1994, the district court issued an order
enjoining Redmond from assuming his position at Quaker
through May 1995, and permanently enjoining him from using
or disclosing any PepsiCo trade secrets or confidential information.4.8 The district court found that Redmond would inevitably disclose PepsiCo's trade secrets at his new job and that
inevitable disclosure could be enjoined under Illinois statutory
and common law. 49 The court also emphasized that
Redmond's lack of forthrightness had led the court to believe
the threat of misappropriation was real. 50
On April 6, 1995, Redmond and Quaker appealed the injunction.51 Both parties stipulated that the primary issue on
appeal was whether the district court correctly concluded that
PepsiCo had a reasonable likelihood of success on its various
claims for trade secret misappropriation and breach of confidentiality agreement. 52

up for reevaluation. Redmond would therefore have an input in remaking these
plans. Id.
45.Id.
46. Id. Redmond described his job as "managing the entire sales effort of
Gatorade at the field level, possibly including strategic planning," and at least at
one point considered his job to be equivalent to that of a Chief Operating Officer.
Id.
47. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1267.
48. Id.
49.Id.
50. Id. The lack of forthrightness referred to, which included Redmond's activities before accepting his job and in his testimony, was a factor leading the court
to believe PepsiCo's claim. Id.
51. Id.
52. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1267. PepsiCo satisfied the other requirements for a
preliminary injunction: whether PepsiCo has an adequate remedy at law or will be
irreparably harmed if the injunction does not issue; whether the threatened injury
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N. BACKGROUND OF INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE IN
ILLINOIS
The theory of inevitable disclosure has developed under
two distinct bodies of law. 53 First, the concept of inevitable
disclosure is embodied in state statutes. 54 Second, the concept
of inevitable disclosure is supported under case law. 55 In
PepsiCo, the Seventh Circuit considered both statutory and
case law when deciding whether a plaintiff may prove a claim
for trade secret misappropriation by demonstrating that
defendant's new employment will inevitably lead him to rely
on the plaintiffs trade secrets. 56
A.

STATUTORY BACKGROUND

In 1979, following ten years of study, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (hereinafter "U.T.S.A.").57 According to the committee's prefatory note, the major impetus behind the draft was the confused state of trade secret common
law. 58 As of 1995, the U.T.S.A. has been enacted in twentyone states. 59

to PepsiCo outweighs the threatened hann the injunction may inflict on Quaker
and Redmond; and whether the granting of the preliminary injunction will disservice the public interest. Quaker and Redmond did not challenge these findings on
appeal.
The remainder of this comment will be confined to the trade secret misappropriation cause of action. Both claims are decided based on the existence of the
inevitable disclosure theory. Once the court finds in favor of PepsiCo on the issue
of trade secret misappropriation, it necessarily finds in favor of PepsiCo on the
issue of breach of Redmond's confidentiality agreement. Once established that
Redmond's position at Quaker would cause him to disclose trade secrets, it follows
that he would necessarily be forced to breach his agreement not to disclose confidential infonnation acquired while employed at PepsiCo. Id.
53. See generally Suellen Lowry, Inevitable Disclosure Trade Secret Disputes:
Dissolutions of Concurrent Property Interests, 40 STAN. L. REv. 519 (1988); See also
PepsiCo, 54 F.3d 1263.
54.Id.
55.Id.
56. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1269.
57. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAw § 3.04 at 3-22.
58. Id.
59. [d.
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The Illinois Trade Secrets Act (hereinafter "LT.S.A."),
patterned after the D.T.S.A., was enacted in 1988.60 The theory of inevitable disclosure is not addressed in either the
D.T.S.A. or the LT.S.A. 61 To establish that a defendant improperly used trade secrets pursuant to the LT.S.A., a claimant
must show that the secret was sensitive, misappropriated, and
used in the appropriator's business. 62 Although the plain language of both the D.T.S.A. and the I.T.S.A. does not provide
protection against inevitable disclosure, some courts have held
that the theory of inevitable disclosure does provide an adequate ground for a suit to enjoin the inevitable disclosure of
trade secrets. 63 The crucial difference between traditional

60. [d. at 3-23.
61. See Illinois Trade Secrets Act, IL ST CH 765, § 1065 et seq.
62. [d.

63. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1267; IL ST CH 765, § 1065 et seq. The I.T.S.A. does
provide the following useful information.
1. Misappropriation means:
i. acquisition of a trade secret of a person by another person who knows or has reason to know that
the trade secret was acquired by improper means;
ii. or disclosure or use of a trade secret of a person
without express or implied consent by another person who;
I. used improper means to acquire knowledge
of the trade secret or;
II. at the time of disclosure or use, knew or
had reason to know that knowledge of the
trade secret was:
A. derived from or through a person
who utilized improper means to acquire it;
B. acquired under circumstances giving
rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit
its use; or
C. derived from or through a person
who owed a duty to the person seeking relief
to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or
III. before a material change of position,
knew or had reason to know that it was a
trade secret and that knowledge of it had
been acquired by accident or mistake.
2. Injunctions:
i. actual or threatened misappropriation may be
enjoined.
IL ST CH 765, § 1065/2 (b).
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threatened misappropriation and inevitable disclosure is that
the latter may be enjoined without proof of intent to disclose. 64
B. ILLINOIS CASE LAw ADDRESSING INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE

The issue of threatened or inevitable misappropriation of
trade secrets has long been the basis for tension in trade secret
law. 65 This tension becomes particularly exacerbated when a
plaintiff sues to prevent not the actual misappropriation of
trade secrets, but the mere threat that the misappropriation
will occur.66 While the I.T.S.A. clearly permits a court to enjoin the threat of misappropriation of trade secrets, neither
Illinois courts nor the Seventh Circuit has determined what
constitutes threatened or inevitable misappropriation. 67 Indeed, only two cases in the Seventh Circuit address the issue:
Teradyne, Inc. v. Clear Communications Corp. (hereinafter
"Teradyne") and AMP Inc. v. Fleischhacker (hereinafter
"AMP).68 AMP discusses inevitable disclosure under the common law, and Teradyne discusses inevitable disclosure under
the I.T.S.A.. 69
1. Inevitable Disclosure under the Common Law

AMP Inc. v. Fleischhacker was the first and only Illinois
case to address the theory, of inevitable disclosure under the
common law. 70 However, since the I.T.S.A. codifies the common law, AMP continues to represent the standard under
Illinois's current statutory scheme. 71

DiBoise and Berger, supra note 1 at 28.
PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1268.
Id.
Id.
68. Id.; Teradyne, Inc. v. Clear Communications Corp., 707 F. Supp. 353
(1989); AMP Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199, (1987).
69. Id. at 1268-9.
70. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1269.; AMP, 823 F.2d 1199.
71. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1269. AMP predates the I.T.S.A.. The I.T.S.A. abolishes any common law remedies or authority contrary to its own terms. The I.T.S.A.
does not, however, represent a major deviation from the Illinois common law of
unfair trade practices. Id.
64.
65.
66.
67.
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In AMP, the court denied a preliminary injunction on the
grounds that the plaintiff, AMP, had failed to show either the
existence of any trade secrets or the likelihood that the defendant, Fleischhacker, a former AMP employee, would compromise those secrets or any other confidential business information.72 AMP, a company that produced electrical and electronic connection devices, argued that Fleischhacker's new position
at AMP's competitor would inevitably lead him to compromise
AMP's trade secrets regarding the manufacture of connectors.73 In rejecting that argument, the court emphasized that
the mere fact that a person assumed a similar position at a
competitor does not, without more, make it inevitable that he
will use or disclose trade secret information so as to demonstrate irreparable injury.74 However, the court noted that
while the facts of AMP were insufficient to state a claim for
threatened misappropriation under an inevitable disclosure
theory, inevitable disclosure would, nonetheless, be a proper
ground for an injunction to protect trade secrets under a more
compelling set of facts.75
2. Inevitable Disclosure Under the I.T.S.A.

Teradyne, Inc. v. Clear Communications was the first case
to address the theory of inevitable disclosure under the
I.T.S.A.76 In Teradyne, Teradyne, Inc. alleged that a competitor, Clear Communications (hereinafter "Clear"), had lured
employees away from Teradyne and had intended to employ
them in the same field. 77 The Teradyne court observed that
threatened misappropriation can be enjoined under Illinois law
where there is a high degree of probability of inevitable and
immediate use of trade secrets. 78 The court held, however,
that Teradyne's complaint failed to state a claim because
Teradyne did not allege that defendants had in fact threatened
to use Teradyne's secrets or that they would inevitably do SO.79
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

AMP, 823 F.2d at 1203.
[d. at 1199, 1201.
[d. at 1207.
[d.; PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1269.
[d. at 1268; Teradyne, 707 F. Supp. 353.
AMP, 823 F.2d at 354.
[d. at 356.
[d.
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The Teradyne court noted that Teradyne's claims would
have avoid summary judgmentSO had it properly alleged inevitable disclosure by including an allegation that (1) Clear intended to use Teradyne's trade secrets, that (2) the former
Teradyne employees had disavowed their confidentiality agreements with Teradyne, or (3) an allegation that Clear could not
operate without Teradyne's secrets. 81 However, the mere stating of defendants' actions, which included working for
Teradyne, knowing its business, leaving its business, hiring
employees from Teradyne and entering the same field, did not
constitute a claim of threatened misappropriation. 82 The court
held that merely alleging that the plaintifi's fear that the defendant competitor could misuse plaintifi's secrets did not
adequately support a claim of inevitable disclosure under the
I.T.S.A.s3

v.

COURT'S ANALYSIS

The Seventh Circuit began its analysis of PepsiCo by discussing the fierce competition between PepsiCo and Quaker
within the beverage industry.84 Although Quaker's sports
drink, "Gatorade," is the dominant brand in its market
niche,s5 PepsiCo attempted to break into the market by introducing its Gatorade rival, "All Sport," in March and April of
1994. 86 To date, sales of All Sport have lagged far behind
those of Gatorade. s7 Quaker also led the market in sales of
new age drinks,ss and, although PepsiCo had attempted to get
ahead by entering that market through joint ventures with the
Thomas J. Lipton Company and Ocean Spray Cranberries,

80. FED. R. elY. P. 12(b)(6). Federal motion to dismiss an action for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Id.
81. Id. at 355.
82.Id.
83. Teradyne, 707 F. Supp. at 357. The court stated that "It may be that little
more is needed, but falling a little short is still falling short." Id.
84. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1263-1264.
85. Id. at 1264.
86.Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. "New age drink" is a catch-all category for non-carbonated soft drinks
and includes such beverages as ready-to-drink tea products and fruit drinks.
Sports drinks may also fall under the new age drink heading. Id.
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Inc., Quaker stifled that strategy by purchasing Snapple Beverage Corp. in late 1994. 89
After laying the industry backdrop, the court factually
analyzed PepsiCo's case. 90 First, the court found that PepsiCo
presented substantial evidence that Redmond possessed extensive and intimate knowledge about PepsiCo's 1995 strategic
goals for their sports drinks and new age drinks. 91 Additionally, the court pointed out that even if Redmond could somehow
refrain from relying on that information, as he promised he
would, his lack of truthfulness about his intentions to leave
PepsiCo made his assurances less than comforting.92 The
court concluded that unless Redmond possessed an "uncanny"
ability to compartmentalize information, he would necessarily
be making decisions about Gatorade and Snapple by relying on
his knowledge of PepsiCo's trade secrets. 93
In reaching its conclusion, the PepsiCo court referred to
the Illinois Trade Secrets Act which provides that a court may
enjoin the actual or threatened misappropriation of a trade
secret. 94 The court further remarked that the question of
threatened or inevitable misappropriation creates a friction in
trade secret law confronting the sometimes opposing teams,
employee and employer. 95 Trade secret law serves to protect
standards of commercial morality and to encourage invention
and innovation while still maintaining public interest in free
and open competition in the manufacture and sale of unpatented goods. 96 Yet, the court noted, that same law should not
prevent workers from pursuing their livelihoods when they

89. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1264. PepsiCo's products have about half the relevant
market share. Additionally, both PepsiCo and Quaker saw 1995 as an important
year for their productsPepsiCo had developed extensive plans to increase its market presence, while Quaker was trying to solidify its lead by integrating Gatorade
and Snapple distribution. Id. at 1264-67.
90. Id. at 1264-67.
91. Id. at 1264. Sports drinks are also called "isotonics," implying that they
contain the same salt concentration as human blood, and "electrolytes," implying
that the substances contained in the drink have dissociated into ions. Id.
92. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1267.
93. [d. at 1269.
94. Id. at 1268.
95. Id. at 1268.
96. Id. (citing JAGER, TRADE SECRET LAw § IL.03 at IL-12).
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leave their current positions. 97 This tension is particularly
aggravated when a plaintiff sues not on the basis of an actual
misappropriation of trade secrets but on the mere threat that it
might occur.9S The court pointed out that while the I.T.S.A.
clearly permits a court to enjoin the threat of misappropriation
of trade secrets, there is little case law in the Illinois courts or
the Seventh Circuit establishing what constitutes threatened
or inevitable misappropriation. 99
On reviewing applicable precedent, the PepsiCo court
found only two Illinois cases addressing the issue of inevitable
disclosure, Teradyne, Inc. v. Clear Communications Corp.1OO
and AMP Inc. v. Fleischhacker. 101 The court distinguished
PepsiCo from both of these cases, based on their finding that
both Teradyne and AMP involved facts too weak to apply the
theory of inevitable disclosure, and asserted that the facts in
PepsiCo were compelling. 102 The court reasoned that
PepsiCo's basis for suspicion rose far above that of the
Teradyne and AMP plaintiffs. 103
In Teradyne and AMP, the plaintiffs asserted only that
skilled employees were taking their skills elsewhere. 104 However, distinguishing these cases from PepsiCo, the court stated
that it was not Redmond's general skills and knowledge acquired during his tenure with PepsiCo that PepsiCo sought to

97. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1268.
98. [d. (emphasis added).

99. [d. The court refers to inevitable disclosure as inevitable misappropriation
in an apparent attempt to use the terms synonymously. It is again noted that
"threatened misappropriation," which is the language in the I.T.S.A., and "inevitable disclosure" are not synonymous. The latter does not require intent. See supra
note 64.
100. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1268; Teradyne, Inc. v. Clear Communications Corp.,
707 F.Supp. 353 (N.D. Ill. 1989) Teradyne was the first case to discuss the theory
of inevitable disclosure under the I.T.S.A. In an insightful opinion, Judge Zagel observed that threatened misappropriation can be enjoined under Illinois law where
there is a high degree of probability of inevitable and immediate use of trade
secrets. [d.; See supra notes 70-83 and accompanying text for analysis of Teradyne.
101. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1269; AMP Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199 (7th
Cir. 1987) Although AMP pre dates the I.T.S.A. it is applicable because the
I.T.S.A. codifies, rather than modifies, the common law doctrine that preceded it.
[d.; See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text for analysis of AMP.
102. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1269.
103. [d.
104. [d.
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keep from falling into Quaker's hands. 105 Rather, PepsiCo
sought to protect only its particularized plans and processes
developed to give them an advantage over their competitors. 106 These plans, which were unknown to others in the
industry, were disclosed to Redmond while the employer-employee relationship existed. l07
Finally, the PepsiCo court noted that a plaintiff may prove
a claim of trade secret misappropriation by demonstrating that
defendant's new employment will inevitably require him to
rely on the plaintiffs trade secrets. lOS The court further stated that the defendants were incorrect that Illinois law does not
allow a court to enjoin the "inevitable" disclosure of trade secrets. 109
Thus, when the court coupled the demonstrated inevitability that Redmond would rely on PepsiCo's trade secrets with
the validation of the inevitable disclosure theory, it concluded
that the district court correctly decided that PepsiCo had demonstrated a likelihood of success on its statutory claim of trade
secret misappropriation. 110 The court affirmatively concluded
that Illinois law allows a court to enjoin the inevitable disclosure of trade secrets, and that an injunction was the appropriate remedy in this case. l1l
VI. CRITIQUE
Historically, courts have been reluctant to permit employers to use a claim of trade secret misappropriation to obtain an
ex post facto covenants not to compete. 112 Courts suspiciously
regard non-competition agreements because they fear that
employers will use the agreements as facades to restrict employee mobility.113 Although courts rule in favor of both em105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

111.
112.
682-83
113.

Id.
Id.
PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1269.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1271.
Id. at 1269.
See Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARv. L. REV. 625,
(1960).
Suellen Lowry, Inevitable Disclosure Trade Secret Disputes, 40 STAN. L.
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ployees and employers, the broad definition of trade secrets
combined with the use of nondisclosure agreements creates the
danger of a pro-employer thread in these cases. 114
In AMP, the Seventh Circuit noted that the hiring of a
competitor's employee was usually permissible. 115 The court
further stated that to prevent such action would disservice the
free market goal of maximizing available resources to foster
competition. 116 Consequently, this would create an improper
balance between the purposes of trade secrets law and the
strong policy in favor of fair and vigorous business competition.1l7 Yet the holding in PepsiCo appears antithetical to
this earlier decision. 11s In effect, the court allowed PepsiCo to
create a fictitious and automatic covenant not to compete. 119
Companies seeking to prevent former employees from
working for competitors have been urging adoption of the inevitable disclosure theory of trade secret misappropriation in an
effort to avoid the judicial disfavor and scrutiny applied to
traditional non-compete agreements. 120 This virtually
transforms a confidentiality agreement into a non-compete
agreement. 121 If readily applied by the courts, the inevitable
disclosure theory could impede an employees' mobility and the
spread of general knowledge which provides the basis for much
of the economic growth in many industries. 122
Often the number of companies for which employees can
work is limited, and typically these companies are competitors.l23 If employees cannot work in the same competitive arREV. at 523.
114. Interview with Michael A. Glenn, Attorney at Law, in San Francisco, CA
(Sept. 15, 1995).
115. See AMP, 823 F.2d at 1205.
116. [d.
117. [d.
118. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1271.
119. See [d.
120. Blake, 73 HARv. L. REV. 625, 682-83 (1960).
121. DiBoise and Berger, Getting Around Barriers To Non-Compete Pacts, 2
NAT'L L.J. CI0 (1995).
122. [d.; For a discussion of employees' bargaining power and its relation to
compensation, See Rubin & Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not to Compete,
10 J. LEGAL STUD. 93, 100-01 (1981).
123. Interview with Michael A. Glenn, Attorney at Law, specializing in intellec-
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ea as their current employment, their options for other employment will be significantly limited. 124 In these instances, the
employee must use his or her skills to find new employment,
even though some or most of those skills may be unalterably
tied to the trade secret information of former employers. 125 If
employees change jobs but remain in the same profession or
trade, they may find it impossible to avoid drawing upon the
skills and experience developed at previous jobs. 126 Disclosure
may be nearly inevitable even though employees do not intend
to appropriate their former employer's trade secrets. 127 Accordingly, employees may not want to increase their expertise,
since the potential acquisition of alleged trade secrets could
prevent them from later advantage in the industry in which
they are most productive. 128
The protection given to trade secrets is a shield, sanctioned by the courts, for the preservation of trust in confidential relationships; it must not become a sword used by employers to retain employees on the threat of rendering them substantially unemployable in the field of their experience if they
decide to resign.129 If employees are threatened, "society suffers because competition is diminished by slackening the dissemination of ideas, processes and methods.,,130
On the other hand, intellectual property is often the lifeblood of a company, especially in high technology
industries. 131 A business certainly has the right to be protected against unfair competition stemming from the usurpation of

tual property; and Adjunct Professor of Law at Golden Gate University, School of
Law; in San Francisco, CA (Sept. 15, 1995).
124. Id.; Blake, 73 HARv. L. REV. at 683 (1960) ("The mobility of untold numbers of employees is restricted by the intimidation of restrictions whose severity no
court would sanction."). Id.
125. DiBoise and Berger, Getting Around Barriers To Non-Compete Pacts, 2
NATL L.J. C12 (1995).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 579, 160 A,2d 430, 435 (1960).
129. DiBoise and Berger, Getting Around Barriers To Non-Compete Pacts, 2
NATL L.J. C12 (1995).
130. Wexler, 399 Pa. at 579.
131. DiBoise and Berger, Inevitable Disclosure of Trade Secrets, 20 NEW MA'ITER
at 29 (1995).
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its trade secrets. 132 As much as a free society supports the
right of employees to change jobs at will, employers who invest
significant efforts in the development of valuable trade secrets
may incur serious losses if this confidential information is
divulged to competitors by departing employees. 133 Without a
means of post-employment protection to assure that valuable
developments or improvements are exclusively those of the
employer, businesses could not afford to subsidize research or
improve current methods. 134 Additionally, without the theory
of inevitable disclosure, threatened misappropriation is often
difficult if not impossible to prove. 135 Finally, courts strongly
support trade secret protection for employers because they
view technological innovation favorably, and because they
believe trade secret protection encourages companies to invest
in new technology. 136
However, in forums such as California, where legislation
declares non-compete agreements unenforceable except in
limited circumstances, the PepsiCo court's ruling appears to fly
in the face of legislative intent. 137 In passing California Business and Professions Code Section 16600, the state legislature
has manifested its clear intent to avoid the viability of noncompete agreements. 13B The PepsiCo ruling circumvents this
legislative intent by transforming a confidentiality agreement
into a de facto non-compete agreement, thereby bypassing
Section 16600. 139 To allow the PepsiCo holding to control California Law would therefore enable courts to avoid clear and
established legislation.

132. Wexler, 399 Pa. at 578.
133. FMC Corp. v. Varco Int'l, 677 F.2d 500 (1982).
134. Wexler, 399 Pa. at 579.
135. Interview with Kevin Patrick McGee, Law Review Editor, in San Francisco,
CA (Dec. 12, 1995). The only two people that know if the secret has actually been
exposed are the ex-employee and the new employer. Most trade secret prosecutions
have to get those two parties to admit or disclose the misappropriation against
their personal and pecuniary interest. [d.
136. See, e.g. Reed, Roberts Assocs., Inc. v. Strauman, 353 N.E.2d 590 (1976).
137. CAL. BuS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1992). The entirety of the statute
reads: "Except as provided in this chapter, every contract by which anyone is
restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is
to that extent void." [d.
138. See id. See generally, Matull & Associates v. Cloutier, 194 Cal. App. 3d
1049 (1987); Farthing v. San Mateo Clinic, 143 Cal. App. 2d 385 (1956).
139. See, JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAw § 13.02 at 13-12.
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VII. CONCLUSION
One of the most difficult issues in trade secret law involves how to protect the competing interests of employers and
employees. l40 Employers seek to restrict the disclosure of
confidential information, whereas employees find that such
restrictions impair their ability to market their skills to new
employers. 141 While courts support the protection of trade secrets, they have traditionally recognized the economic benefits
of disclosure since other innovative individuals and firms will
have the opportunity to develop and build upon the new technology.142 Although the arguments expressed by proponents
of both sides of this dilemma are understandable, an inevitable
disclosure theory that allows employers to prevent an employee
from working for a competitor in the employee's area of expertise for an unlimited amount of time and without any compensation to the employee is a menacing restriction. As Judge
Learned Hand long ago observed:
... it has never been thought actionable to take
away another's employee, when the defendant
wants to use him in his own business, however
much the plaintiff may suffer. It is difficult to
see how servants could get the full value of their
services on any other terms; time creates no

140. See supra note 65.
141. See Suellen Lowry, Inevitable Disclosure of Trade Secrets: Dissolutions of
Concurrent Property Interests, 40 STAN. L. REV. 519 (1988).
142. See, e.g. Reed, Roberts Assocs., Inc., 353 N.E. 2d 590.
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prescriptive right in other men's labor. If an
employer expects so much, he must secure it by
[a] contract [not to compete].l43

Therefore, PepsiCo represents a perilous precedent. 144

Johanna L. Edelstein·

143. Harley & Lund Corp. v. Murray Rubber Co., 31 F.2d 932, 934 (1929).
144. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d 1263.
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